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I. INTRODUCTION

The United States Supreme Court's decision in a Florida rape-victim privacy case, The Florida Star v. B.J.F.,' introduced a tough
balancing test into the conflict between first amendment and privacy
rights. The decision extended constitutional protection to the publication of information released by the government into the public domain,
while it curtailed nondisclosure statutes and privacy tort law.2 As a
result, the press cannot be held automatically liable for publishing
information normally withheld by state law. 3 Moreover, the burden of
protecting rape victim's privacy shifted almost entirely to the govern4
ment.
The FloridaStar Court held that a state statute violated the first
amendment by imposing damages on a newspaper for publishing a
rape victim's name obtained from a publicly released police report. 5
In reversing a civil damage award, the Court limited its decision to
the facts in FloridaStar.6 Accordingly, the Court extended a "limited
principle," to apply to the facts of each case, balancing first amendment
rights against privacy rights. 7 The principle, first articulated in Smith
v. Daily Mail Publishing," permits a state to punish publication of
lawfully obtained, truthful information about a matter of public significance only if the state can show that the punishment is narrowly
tailored to further a state interest of the highest order. 9 Important

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

109 S. Ct. 2603 (1989).
Id. at 2610-13.
Id. at 2612.
Id. at 2609 (discussing various government means of safeguarding information).
Id. at 2613.
Id.
Id. at 2609.
443 U.S. 97 (1979).
109 S. Ct. at 2609 (citing Daily Mail, 443 U.S. at 103).
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to a later application of Florida Star,10 the Court looked beyond the
specific disclosure to the entire article to determine that publication
concerned a matter of public significance."
The Florida Star Court held negligence per se unconstitutional
when imposed on the press. 12 In Florida, violation of a statute constitutes negligence per se where the statute sets a standard of care to
protect a particular class of persons.' 3 In FloridaStar, the nondisclosure statute protected the identity of sexual assault victims. 14 Thus,
the Court reasoned liability followed automatically from the publication.15 Accordingly, the Court concluded that such "categorical prohibitions" prevent a case-by-case examination to determine whether the
disclosure was highly offensive, a requirement of privacy tort law.16
The Court also held that a statute that singles out the press for
17
punishment fails to meet the state's statutory purpose.
Constitutional scholars and media lawyers cite FloridaStar as an
indication that the Supreme Court interprets first amendment cases
liberally while shifting to a more politically conservative position in
other areas.' The FloridaStar decision has immediately affected pri-

10. Applied four months later by the Florida Supreme Court in Cape Publications Inc. v.
Hitchner, 549 So. 2d 1374 (Fla. 1989).
11. 109 S. Ct. at 2611.
12. Id. at 2612.
13. See 38 FLA. JUR. 2d NEGLIGENCE §§ 51-52 (1981); Reliance Elec. Co. v. Humphrey,
427 So. 2d 214 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1983).
14. FLA. STAT. § 794.03 (1987). The statute provides in its entirety:
Unlawful to publish or broadcast information identifying sexual offense victims.No person shall print, publish, or broadcast, or cause or allow to be printed,
published, or broadcast, in any instrument of mass communication the name, address, or other identifying fact or information of the victim of any sexual offense
within this chapter. An offense under this section shall constitute a misdemeanor
of the second degree, punishable as provided in § 775.082, § 775.083, or § 775.084.
Id.
15. 109 S. Ct. at 2612.
16. Id. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977).
17. 109 S. Ct. at 2613. See Daily Mail, 443 U.S. at 104-05.
18. Burt Newborne, Professor of Constitutional Law at New York University, believes the
Supreme Court is shifting to the right in equality cases, but "not yet" in first amendment cases.
He said opinions such as FloridaStar were "exceptionally careful" to maintain status quo legal
norms. John P. McCrory, a Washington lawyer, said Florida Star followed a trend of privacy
cases in other courts that were decided narrowly and limited to their own sets of facts. PLI
Seminar Considers Libel by Implication Cases, News Notes, 16(42) MEDIA L. REP., reporting
on Practicing Law Institute's Communication Law Seminar held Nov. 9-10, 1989, New York
(Nov. 28, 1989).
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vacy plaintiffs and media defendants. 19 In addition, Florida Star affected a criminal defendant appealing a conviction for divulging confifollowed
dential information,20 and courts in various kinds of civil action
21
the style of the case in protecting the privacy of parties.
This article examines FloridaStar's impact on these cases as well
as the impact it may have on future cases involving privacy torts and
state laws protecting the identity of crime victims, and on access to
public records. The analysis will attempt to determine what types of
nondisclosure laws the Supreme Court will accept and what it may
be willing to tolerate in statutes punishing the press.
II.

THE FLORIDA STAR V.

B.J.F.

The primary question appealed by The Florida Star was whether
a state may impose civil and criminal sanctions on a newspaper for
publishing lawfully obtained, truthful information found in government
records.- The Florida Star challenged a Florida nondisclosure law,
section 794.03.2 Section 794.03 provides that to "print, publish, or
broadcast . . . in any instrument of mass communication" the name
or any identifying information of a victim of a sexual offense constitutes
a second degree misdemeanor.? The Court held that The FloridaStar
could not be punished for publishing information publicly released in
a police report.? Stressing the narrowness of its holding, the Court
recognized the state interest in protecting victims' identities as "highly

19. See Cape Publications, Inc. v. Hitchner, 549 So. 2d 1374 (Fla. 1989) (quashing in part
a summary judgment of liability against a newspaper under a private-facts tort and remanding
the case); Easton Publishing v. Boettger, 110 S.Ct. 225 (1989) (vacating judgment and remanding
to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, Eastern District, for further consideration in light of
FloridaStar); Ross v. Midwest Communications, Inc., 870 F.2d 271, 272-75 (5th Cir.) (affirming
summary judgment for journalists in a state law invasion-of-privacy claim brought by a rape
victim), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 326 (1989).
20. United States v. Wallington, 889 F.2d 573, 575-80 (5th Cir. 1989) (affirming the conviction of a public employee for divulging confidential law enforcement information in violation of
a federal statute).
21. M.A.S. & D.P.S. v. United States, 1989 U.S. Dist. Lexis 9169 (W.D. Mo.) (No. 89-6045CV-SJ-6), Aug. 7, 1989 (denying motion to seal file by plaintffs in an AIDS-related suit against
a government hospital, but revising the name of the case to plaintiffs' initials to preserve their
privacy interests). See also A.A. v. E.P., 559 So. 2d 622 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1990) (protecting
children's privacy interests); M.L.B. & J.B. v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Serv.,
559 So. 2d 87 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1990) (protecting child's privacy interests).
22. Brief of Appellant at 1, The Florida Star v. B.J.F., 499 So. 2d 883 (Fla. 1st D.C.A.
1986) (No. 87-329).
23. FLA. STAT. § 794.03 (1987). See § 794.03 supra note 14.
24. Id.
25. 109 S. Ct. at 2613.
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significant. '' 26 However, the Court ruled that the liability imposed
under section 794.03 failed to adequately serve the state's interests.27
Thus, the Court concluded that the state's application of section 794.03
under the facts in Florida Star failed to meet the strict burden the
Court imposed on the state.?
A.

The Facts of The Florida Star v. B.J.F.
1. Commencement of the Civil Suit

On October 20, 1983, B.J.F.- reported to the Duval County
Sheriffs Department that an unknown assailant robbed and sexually
assaulted her.- The Sheriffs Department placed the incident report,
3
which identified B.J.F. by her full name, in its open press room. '
The Florida Star is a small Jacksonville, Florida, weekly newspaper
with a circulation of 18,000.2 A reporter-trainee for The FloridaStar
copied the police report verbatim, including B.J.F.'s full name, on a
blank duplicate of the department's forms. A reporter from The
Florida Star rewrote the report in a one-paragraph article.3 Despite
The FloridaStar's internal policy of not publishing the names of sexual
offense victims,, the newspaper published B.J.F.'s full name.3 6 The
article appeared under "Robberies" as one of fifty-four police-blotter
stories in the "Police Reports" section. 37 In 1984, B.J.F. filed suit
26. Id. at 2611.
27. Id. at 2613.
28. Id.
29. The appellee was referred to as B.J.F. by the appellate courts throughout the appeal
process, although she and the trial court used her full name in the original action. Id. at 2605 n.2.
30. Id. at 2605.
31. Id. Florida's Public Records Law, with a few specific exemptions, requires most public
agency records to be open to public inspection. FLA. STAT. § 119 (1983). The identity of rape
victims is among the exemptions from this law, as well as being information protected by §
794.03. As the legal custodian of public records generated by its law enforcement activities, the
sheriffs department is responsible for protecting the confidentiality of information exempted
from the public records law. Id. § 119.07(2)(a) (1987).
32. 109 S.Ct. at 2605.
33. Id. The reporter testified during the trial that the department had posted a sign in the
press room stating it was against the law to publish the name of a rape victim. Brief for the
Appellee at 6-7, The Florida Star v. B.J.F. (No. 87-329).
34. 109 S. Ct. at 2606.
35. Both the reporter and the staff writer testified they were aware of the newspaper's
internal policy against publishing the names of rape victims. The publisher testified that six
employees in the supervisory chain missed the error. Brief for the Appellee at 7-8.
36. 109 S. Ct. at 2606.
37. Id. The article read:
[BJF] reported on Thursday, October 20, she was crossing Brentwood Park, which
is in the 500 block of Golfair Boulevard, enroute to her bus stop, when an unknown
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against the sheriffs department and The FloridaStar.A B.J.F. alleged
39
the defendants negligently violated Florida's nondisclosure statute
and invaded her privacy. 40 Before trial, the sheriffs department settled
with B.J.F. for $2500. 4' The trial judge rejected The Florida Star's
motion to dismiss B.J.F.'s claim on the ground that the statute violated
4
the first amendment. 2
2.

Trial Court Decision

At the trial, B.J.F. testified that a fellow worker brought the
article to her while B.J.F. was in the hospital recovering from the
assault. 43 B.J.F. testified that a man called her mother several times
and threatened to rape B.J.F. again." B.J.F.'s fear of the caller forced
her to change her phone number and residence. 45 B.J.F. stated that
she sought police protection and required mental health counseling
because of the publicity and the calls.46
In defense, The FloridaStar argued that the newspaper acquired
the plaintiffs name lawfully from a "public record" and inadvertently
departed from the newspaper's policy of not printing the names of
rape victims.4 7 The Florida Star also argued that the Florida Public
Records Act 4" places responsibility on the sheriff to delete nondisclo9
sure information exempted from the public record.4
In response, B.J.F. argued that The Florida Star obtained her
name unlawfully because the public records law explicitly exempted
rape victims' names from matters of public record.- ° B.J.F. argued
that the statutory exemption equally bound the newspaper as legal

black man ran up behind the lady and placed a knife to her neck and told her not

to yell. The suspect then undressed the lady and had sexual intercourse with her
before fleeing the scene with her 60 cents, Timex watch and gold necklace. Patrol
efforts have been suspended concerning this incident because of a lack of evidence.
Id.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id.
Id.
Brief for the Appellee at 4.
109 S. Ct. at 2606.
Id.
Id. (citing Brief for the Appellee at 5).
Id. (citing Brief for the Appellee at 6).
Id.
Id.
Id.
FLA. STAT. § 119 (1983). See supra note 31.
Brief of Appellant at 17.
Brief for the Appellee at 8 (citing FLA. STAT. § 119.07).
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custodian of the public record. 51 Further, the sheriffs department's
failure to withhold the exempted information did not make the newspaper's action lawful. 52 The trial judge agreed and granted B.J.F. a
directed verdict on liability.- The trial judge also ruled that section
794.03 provided a constitutional balance between first amendment and
privacy rights, and applied to a narrow class of sensitive criminal
offenses.5
The trial judge further held the newspaper negligent per se because
it violated the nondisclosure statute.- The trial judge's holding effectively left the jury to decide, not whether, but how much to award
B.J.F. The jury found that the newspaper "acted with reckless indifference to the rights of others. '"- Accordingly, the jury awarded
$25,000 in punitive damages in addition to $75,000 in compensatory
damages. 57
B.

The Path to the United States Supreme Court

The Florida Star appealed to the Florida First District Court of
Appeal. The appellate court affirmed the lower court's judgment in a
three-paragraph per curiam opinion holding a rape victim's name
should "not to be published as a matter of law."- Paul J. Levine, a
Miami lawyer who recognized the first amendment implications of the
case, filed an amicus curiae brief in the appeal for the Florida First
Amendment Foundation.- Levine criticized the appellate court for
refusing "to confront the constitutional issues" presented by the facts
of Florida Star.ro After the newspaper's defeat on appeal, the St.
Petersburg Times and its legal counsel, George Rahdert, donated hundreds of hours to appeal the district court's decision. Rahdert described
the appeal as a "tortured path" to the United States Supreme Court.61
51. Id. at 12.
52. Id.
53. 109 S. Ct. at 2606.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. The trial judge reduced the compensatory award by $2500 to offset B.J.F.'s settlement with the Sheriffs Department. Id. The jury's award almost put The Florida Star out of
business since the newspaper could not pay B.J.F. $97,500 and lacked insurance. A. Messerschmidt, Miami Herald, Al, col. 5 (Dec. 29, 1986).
58. 499 So. 2d 883, 884 (Fla. 1986).
59. Wendy H. Cohen participated in the amicus curiae brief for the Foundation.
60. Telephone interview with Paul Levine, Attorney at Law, in Miami, Florida (Oct. 6,
1989).
61. Telephone interview with George Rahdert, Legal Counsel for the St. Petersburg Times,
in St. Petersburg, Florida (Oct. 5, 1989).
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The Florida Supreme Court summarily denied review on May 28,
1987. Seven months later, the United States Supreme Court certified
to the Florida Supreme Court a question of whether the state high
court had jurisdiction at the time it denied review.6
The Florida court answered affirmatively on September 1, 1988.6
Thus, the appeal to the United States Supreme Court was timely.
The United States Supreme Court heard arguments six months later
and announced its decision on June 21, 1989.
C.

The Court's Analysis

The United States Supreme Court reversed the state appellate
court and concluded that imposing damages on The FloridaStar for
publishing B.J.F.'s name violated the first amendment.6 Writing for
the Court, Justice Thurgood Marshall noted a continuing tension between the first amendment rights of the press and the privacy protection established by statutes and common law doctrines.- The majority
recognized that historically, the Court "without exception" upheld the
right of the press to publish truthful information. 67 Yet, the Court
resolved each conflict based on the facts of the particular case before
it. Accordingly, the Court concluded FloridaStar must be examined
on its particular facts.

62. 509 So. 2d 1117 (Fla. 1987).
63. 484 U.S. 984, (1987).
64. Florida Star, 530 So. 2d at 286. B.J.F.'s attorney, Joel Eaton, had filed a motion to
dismiss the appeal before the United States Supreme Court on the ground the appeal was
untimely. He argued the Florida Supreme Court had lacked jurisdiction when it denied review,
so The FloridaStar should have filed an appeal to the United States Supreme Court within 90
days of the first district's opinion. Id. at 287. A ten-year-old amendment to the Florida Constitution grants the Florida Supreme Court jurisdiction over district court decisions with an opinion
that could create a conflict with another court. FLA. CONST. Art. V, § 3(b)(3). Subsequently,
the supreme court does not have subject-matter jurisdiction over a decision without an opinion
or citation. 530 So. 2d at 288 n.3. See also Jenkins v. State, 385 So. 2d. 1356, 1357 (Fla. 1980).
Eaton argued that the first district's three-paragraph opinion was the final decision of the
highest state court with jurisdiction. 530 So. 2d at 287. The Florida Supreme Court said the
district court opinion had met the requirements of the amendment for subject-matter jurisdiction.
Id. at 288. Moreover, the court noted that as the final authority over the Florida Constitution,
it had discretion to hear even those cases that the amendment excluded from its subject-matter
jurisdiction. Id. at 288-89. The United States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction. Florida
Star, 109 S. Ct. at 216.
65. 109 S. Ct. at 2608.
66. Id. at 2607.
67. Id.
68. Id.
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A trilogy of United States Supreme Court cases, Cox Broadcasting
Corp. v. Cohn,69 Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District Court,70 and
Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co.,71 framed the argument before
the Court. Each case involved the conflict between the first amendment interest in publishing truthful information and the state's interest
in protecting individual privacy.7 A fourth case, Landmark Communi3 formed the basis for the Daily Mail decision.
cations Inc. v. Virginia,7
1. History
a. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn
In the first case in the trilogy, Cox Broadcasting, the United
States Supreme Court reversed a civil damage award against a tele7
vision station for broadcasting the identity of a rape murder victim. 4
The state court based the award on a Georgia statute 75 which made
publishing or broadcasting the identity of rape victims a misdemeanor . 7 6 The news reporter learned the victim's identity from
copies of indictments made available in open court during the trial of
one of the six defendants charged with the crime. 77 The trial court
rejected the television station's constitutional claims and granted a
summary judgment in favor of the victim's father. 78 The court held
that the statute provided a civil remedy to those injured by its violation. 79 The Georgia Supreme Court ultimately upheld the statute as
a "legitimate limitation on the right of freedom of expression" and
found no public concern in publishing the identity of the victim.On appeal, the United States Supreme Court reversed and held
that the press could not be liable for publishing truthful information
released in public court records.81 The Court declined to rule on the
broader questions of whether the state may ever subject truthful
publication to civil or criminal liability, or whether the state may ever

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

420 U.S. 469 (1975).
430 U.S. 308 (1977).
443 U.S. 97 (1979).
109 S. Ct. at 2607.
435 U.S. 829 (1978).
420 U.S. at 471-76.
GA. CODE ANN. § 26-9901 (1972).
420 U.S. at 471-74.
Id. at 472.
Id. at 474. Since the victim died, the father sued on her behalf. Id.
Id.
Id. at 475.
Id. at 496.
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protect an area of privacy from unwanted publicity. 82 Significantly,
the Court looked beyond the disclosure of the victim's identity and
focused instead on the judicial proceedings arising from the prosecution
of the crime.
The Court found that judicial proceedings arising from violent
crimes "are without question events of legitimate concern to the public
....

"8 The Court reasoned that since the scrutiny of the press helps

guarantee fair trials,- the Court has long extended special protection
to accurate reports of judicial proceedings.8 Accordingly, the Court
recognized that the press should scrutinize government operations and
that official public records constitute the basic data of government
operations.87 Thus, the Court concluded that privacy interests fade
when the information involved appears on the public record.- Accordingly, when the state places information on official court records the
Court must presume the state intends to serve the public interest. 89
Therefore, under the Cox Broadcasting analysis, any state interest
in protecting privacy in judicial proceedings may only be served by
keeping the information off the public record.b.

Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District Court
In the second case, Oklahoma Publishing,the Court found a state
court's order which prohibited the press from publishing the identity
of a boy involved in a juvenile proceeding to be unconstitutional. 9 1 In
an open court detention hearing, reporters learned the name of an
11-year-old boy charged with second-degree murder.- Several newspapers and radio and television stations reported the boy's name.- At
the arraignment five days later, the trial judge issued a pretrial order
enjoining publication of the boy's name and picture.- The Oklahoma

82. Id. at 491.
83. Id. at 490-93.
84. Id. at 492.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 492-93 (citing Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966); Estes v. Texas, 381
U.S. 532 (1965); Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331
(1946); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941)).
87. 420 U.S. at 491-92.
88. Id. at 494-95.
89. Id. at 495.
90. Id. at 495-96.
91. 430 U.S. at 308-12.
92. Id. at 309.
93. Id.
94. Id.
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Supreme Court sustained the order, relying on Oklahoma statutes 95
requiring closed juvenile proceedings and records unless a judge specifically opened them to the public.9
The United States Supreme Court held that the state could not
constitutionally prohibit publication of a juvenile's name previously
revealed in an open court proceeding.97 The Court reasoned that when
a court made a hearing public, "what transpired there could not be
'
subject to prior restraint."98
The Court noted that the trial court failed
to object to the presence of the press in the courtroom.- Further,
the trial court presented no evidence that the reporters obtained the
name unlawfully "or even without the State's implicit approval."'1'0
c.

Smith v.Daily Mail Publishing Co.

In the third case, Daily Mail, the Court upheld an order prohibiting
an indictment against two newspapers for publishing the identity of
a juvenile accused of a shooting death.10 The newspaper obtained the
identity of the boy from various sources, including witnesses, police,
and a local prosecutor. 102 In addition to the newspapers' publication,
three radio stations broadcast the juvenile's name. - Yet, nearly three
weeks later, a grand jury indicted only the newspapers for violating
a West Virginia statute.104 The statute made it a misdemeanor "for a
newspaper to publish, without written approval of the juvenile court,
the name of any youth charged as a juvenile offender.' 0 5 The newspapers sought a writ of prohibition, arguing the statute violated the first
and fourteenth amendments.116 The West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals agreed and issued the writ. 0 7 The court found that the statute
operated as a prior restraint and that the state interest in protecting
the identities of juvenile offenders failed to overcome a heavy presumption against prior restraints. °8
§§ 1111, 1125 (Supp. 1976).

95.
96.

OKLA. STAT. ANN. Tit. 10
430 U.S. at 309-10.

97.
98.

Id. at 310-12. (per curium opinion).
Id. at 311 (relying on Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 568 (1976) (citing

Cox Broadcasting,420 U.S. at 469)).

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

430 U.S. at 311.
Id.
443
Id.
Id.
W.
443

U.S. at 99-106.
at 99.
VA. CODE § 49-7-3 (1976).
U.S. at 98.

106.

Id. at 100.

107.
108.

Id.
Id.
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The United States Supreme Court affirmed the order against the
indictments, but declined to decide whether the statute created a prior
restraint. 109 The Court ruled that a state must show that any punitive
action furthers a state interest, even when the punishment occurs
after publication. 1 ° Further, the Court noted that "state action to
punish the publication of truthful information seldom can satisfy constitutional standards.""I Although the Court found no controlling precedent, three recent decisions1 2 taken together suggested "that if a
newspaper lawfully obtains truthful information about a matter of
public significance then state officials may not constitutionally punish
publication of the information, absent a need to further a state interest
' ' 13
of the highest order. 7
The Court pointed out that in all of the related cases, the govern14
ment provided access to the information or made access possible. '
However, the Court placed more emphasis on the Daily Mail newspapers' use of routine reporting techniques to learn the identity of the
juvenile.115 The Court held that the first amendment rights of the
press prevailed over the state's interest, which was to further the
rehabilitation of juveniles by protecting their identities.1e The Court
reasoned that the state's interest could not justify criminal penalties
and the West Virginia statute failed to serve that interest." 7 Moreover,
the statute unconstitutionally singled out newspapers by not restricting the electronic media or other forms of publication.-,
d. Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia
In Landmark Communications, the Court held unconstitutional a
state law 19 punishing media disclosure of confidential investigations
into judicial misconduct.120 An accurate report in a Landmark newspaper identified a judge under investigation by a state judicial review

109. Id. at 102.
110. Id. (relying on Landmark Communications, 435 U.S. at 843).
111. 443 U.S. at 102.
112. Landmark Communications, 435 U.S. at 829; Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District
Court, 430 U.S. 308 (1977); Cox Broadcasting, 420 U.S. at 469.
113. 443 U.S. at 103.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 104.
117. Id. at 105.
118. Id. at 104-05.
119. VA. CODE § 2.1-37.13 (1973).
120. Landmark Communications, 435 U.S. at 837-45.

WHEN IDENTITIES ARE WRONGFULLY DISCLOSED

commission. 121 A month later, a grand jury indicted the newspaper
for violating a statute that made divulging the identity of a judge
under investigation by the commission a misdemeanor. '2 In a nonjury
trial, the Court found Landmark guilty and fined Landmark $500 plus
costs. 12 The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed.- u
The United States Supreme Court reversed.'2 While noting that
the statute was not a prior restraint, the Court found that the interests
advanced by the state were insufficient to justify the restraints on
free speech and the press.126 The Court recognized the state interests,
which included maintaining the confidentiality of commission proceedings, protecting the reputation of judges, and maintaining the integrity
of the courts, as legitimate state interests.127 However, the Court held
the interests failed to justify the encroachment on first amendment
guarantees.

28

2.

The Arguments

The Florida Star argued that Cox Broadcasting controlled the
issues in FloridaStar.'2 In both cases, the reporter lawfully obtained
the identifying information from the government; only the branches
of government differed.1 ° In Cox Broadcasting, the judicial branch of
government supplied the protected information.3' In Florida Star,
the executive branch released the name. - Both cases involved statutes
protecting the identities of victims of sexual assault.13 Both cases
involved news reports about matters of public interest.' M Both news
reports published truthful information contained in public records lawfully obtained by routine newsgathering techniques.'- In addition, The
Florida Star argued that the statute created a prior restraint, with

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 831.

127.

Id. at 841.

at 832.
at 834.
at 838. See, e.g. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64-65 (1976).

128. Id. Also, the Court stated the state's justifications for the restraint amounted to
"assertion and conjecture." Id.
129. 109 S. Ct. at 2608 (citing Brief of Appellant at 8).
130. Id. Brief of Appellant at 8-9.
131. Id.
132. Id. The Sheriff's Department acts as a law enforcer for the executive branch. Id.
133. Id. at 9-10.
134. Id. at 12.
135. Id.
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no procedure for testing or balancing its application.- 3' The Florida
Star also attacked the state courts' use of the negligence per se theory
against the press. 137 Finally, The Florida Star asked the Court for a
"broader First Amendment principle that the press may never be
punished, civilly or criminally, for publishing the truth."',
B.J.F. countered that Cox Broadcasting was not controlling on
the issues in Florida Star. 39 B.J.F. noted that the defendant in Cox
Broadcasting obtained the identity of a rape victim lawfully through
open judicial proceedings.140 Conversely, The Florida Star obtained
B.J.F.'s name unlawfully because the Florida nondisclosure law made
the identity of a rape victim confidential.41 B.J.F. emphasized that
the Cox Broadcasting Court declined to establish an absolute first
amendment right to publish truthful information based on society's
concern with both privacy and free press rights.142 Thus, B.J.F. argued
Cox Broadcasting left open the question of whether the first amendment protects the press from liability for publishing information in
records which by law are not public records.'" Finally, B.J.F. argued
that a rule punishing publication of rape victim's names furthered
three interests: the privacy of sexual offense victims; the physical
safety of such victims, who may be targets of retaliation if their names
become known to the assailants; and the state goal of encouraging
victims to report sexual offenses without fear of exposure.1 4
3.

The Court's Response

The Court agreed with B.J.F. that Cox Broadcasting should not
control the issues in FloridaStar since Cox Broadcasting concerned
information obtained from court records that were open to public inspection.1 45 Justice Marshall emphasized that the Cox Broadcasting
Court specifically noted the "special protected nature of accurate reports of judicial proceedings. '' 146 Also, the Cox Broadcasting Court
focused on the role of the press in opening the judicial system to
7
public scrutiny and helping to guarantee fair trials.14
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Id. at 31.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 19.
Id. Brief for the Appellee at 21.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 21-22.
Id. at 22.
109 S. Ct. at 2611.
Id. at 2608.
Id. (quoting Cox Broadcasting, 420 U.S. at 492 (emphasis in original)),
109 S. Ct. at 2611.
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In the Florida Star dissent, Justice Byron White,14s agreed with
the majority's distinction between the two cases. 149 Justice White emphasized, "[J]udicial records have always been considered public information in this country" and in Cox Broadcastingstate law opened the
records to the public. 15 Conversely, in FloridaStar, state law withheld
the information at issue from public release.151
Rather than relying on Cox Broadcasting,the Court relied on the
"limited First Amendment principle" articulated in Daily Mail. s2 The
Daily Mail Court concluded that a state may punish publication of
lawfully obtained "truthful information about a matter of public significance" only if the state shows that the punishment is narrowly tailored
to further a state interest of the highest order.- The Court focused
on three important reasons to protect the press with the Daily Mail
principle. First, since the standard only protects information lawfully
obtained, the government could protect sensitive information in alternative ways other than by punishing the press. 154 Second, when the
information has been publicly released, punishing the press fails to
serve the government's interest in protecting the victims' privacy.-5
Third, self-censorship may result from punishing the media for publish1
ing truthful information released by the government. -'
The dissent criticized the majority's reliance on the Daily Mail
principle. 157 Justice White considered the Daily Mail "rule" as only a
hypothesis that should not be taken as constitutional dogma.' Justice
White argued that Daily Mail concerned the disclosure of the name
of an accused murderer. 159 In contrast, Florida Star concerned the
rights of a crime victim. - Thus, Justice White concluded that "[T]he
rights of crime victims to stay shielded from public view must be

148. White's dissent was joined by Chief Justice William Rehnquist and Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor. Id. at 2416. Justice White also wrote the majority opinion in Cox Broadcasting 420
U.S. at 469.
149. 109 S. Ct. at 2614.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 2609.
153. Id. (quoting Daily Mail, 443 U.S. at 103).
154. 109 S. Ct. at 2609.
155. Id. at 2615.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. White stated that prior cases only suggested the Daily Mail principle but none
of the prior cases directly controlled Daily Mail. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 2605.
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infinitely more substantial" than the "minimal" rights of those accused
of crime to remain anonymous.1 61 Finally, Justice White wrote, "Daily
Mail was careful to state that the 'holding in this case is narrow...
there is no issue here of privacy.' "162Thus, Justice White concluded
that privacy as the principal issue in FloridaStar takes FloridaStar
outside the Daily Mail holding.1
4.

The Daily Mail Principle

The Court ruled that applying the Daily Mail principle to the facts
in FloridaStar demanded reversal. 164
The Court found that in addition
to being lawfully obtained and truthful, the information in the news
article addressed "a matter of public significance. "165 The Court also
found that the liability imposed on the publication in Florida Star
failed to meet the Daily Mail standard requiring the punishment to
"further a state interest of the highest order. "166 Finally, the Court
expressed concern that liability would result in the media's self-censor-

ship. 167
a.

Truthful Information Lawfully Obtained

The Court found that The Florida Star lawfully obtained B.J.F.'s
name. 16 The Court noted B.J.F.'s argument that the identity of rape
victims in police reports are not matters of public record. 169 However,
the Court found that "the fact that state officials are not required to
disclose such reports does not make it unlawful for a newspaper to
receive them when furnished by the government.' 170 Further, the
Court concluded that the government's failure to fulfill its statutory
obligation to prevent the private information from being published
could not make the receipt of confidential information unlawful.171

161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
(1983))).
170.
171.

Id. at 2615.
Id. (quoting Daily Mail, 443 U.S. at 105 (emphasis and omission in original)).
109 S. Ct. at 2615.
Id. at 2610.
Id. at 2610-11.
Id. at 2611.
Id. at 2610.
Id. at 2611.
Id. at 2610. (citing Brief for the Appellee at 17-18 (citing FLA. STAT. § 119.07(3)(h)
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 2610-11.
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1. Alternative Means to Protect Privacy
The Court limited the means by which states may guard against
the dissemination of private facts to nothing as drastic as punishing
truthful publication. 172 The Court reasoned that despite the limitation,
the state retained "ample means" of protecting private information,
especially when the state possesses the sensitive information. 73 The
Court suggested the following internal procedures to safeguard information: "The government may classify certain information, establish
and enforce procedures ensuring its redacted release, and extend a
damages remedy against the government or its officials where the
government's mishandling of sensitive information leads to its dissemi-

nation.

174

Furthermore, the Court left some questions unanswered. First,
the Court noted that neither the Daily Mail principle nor the Florida
Star decision settled the issue of whether the press may be punished
for unlawful acquisition of private information. 175 Second, the Court
noted that Florida had not prohibited the receipt of confidential information. 176 Thus, the Court left open the questions of whether government restraints on unlawfully acquired information or on receipt of
information would be constitutional.
2. A Matter of Public Significance
The Court also found that the news article concerned "a matter of
public significance.' ' 177 The Court looked beyond the specific identity
revealed in the article and instead considered the article as a whole.178
The Court concluded that the article's subject matter, the investigation
of a violent crime, constituted a matter of "paramount" interest to
the public. 179Conversely, in the dissent, Justice White found no public
interest in publishing the names of crime victims.18

172.

Id. at 2609.

173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 2610, n.8.
176.

Id. at 2611.

177. Id. (quoting Daily Mail, 443 U.S. at 103 (1979)).
178. 109 S. Ct. 2611.
179. Id. In weighing the importance of the article, the Court followed its previous holdings
in the trilogy of cases above, as well as Landmark Communications. Id. See also supra notes

69-71 and accompanying text.
180. 109 S.Ct. at 2619. (White, J. dissenting). The dissent also found no public interest
in "immunizing the press from liability in the rare cases where a State's efforts to protect a
victim's privacy have failed." Id.
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A State Interest of the Highest Order

The majority found that the liability imposed on The FloridaStar
failed to "further a state interest of the highest order."18, Accordingly,
the Court concluded that the Florida nondisclosure law, section 794.03,
failed to meet the strict Daily Mail standard. 182 The Court recognized
B.J.F.'s argument that punishing publication furthered three state
interests: the privacy of the victims, protecting victims from retaliation
by assailants, and encouraging victims to report sexual offenses. 8
Moreover, the Court agreed that these interests constituted "highly
significant interests.",- The Court also stated that someday a privacy
case may meet the high standards of the Daily Mail principle.'However, the Court considered imposing liability under the facts
of Florida Star as too extreme a means to further the government
interests. 186 Thus, the Court based its holding that the liability imposed
in FloridaStar did not serve the governmental interests advanced on
three independent reasons. First, the information was already in the
public domain.187 Second, negligence per se unconstitutionally imposed
categorical prohibitions on the media.'8 Third, singling out the press
for punishment made the statute underinclusive.189
1. Information in the Public Domain
The Court emphasized that the government placed the information
in the public domain, which implied that the government expected
further dissemination of the information. 90 The Court held that the
sheriffs department's failure to protect the information undercut
Florida's policy against disclosing rape victims' identities.'1' Accordingly, the state failed to police itself by disseminating the informa-

181.
182.

Id. at 2611 (quoting Daily Mail, 443 U.S. at 103).
109 S. Ct. at 2611-13.

183.

Id. at 2611.

184. Id.
185. Id. The Court held: "We accordingly do not rule out the possibility that, in a proper
case, imposing civil sanctions for publication of the name of a rape victim might be so overwhelmingly necessary to advance those interests as to satisfy the Daily Mail standard." Id. Unfortu-

nately the Court did not provide any insight into what type of case would meet the Daily Mail
standard.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at
at

2613.
2611-13.
2612.
2612-13.
2611-12.
2611.
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tion.192 Thus,

the Court concluded that imposing damages against the
press for publishing information released by the state was not a means
sufficiently tailored to safeguard victims' anonymity.193 The Court
reasoned that where the government makes information publicly available, punishing anyone other than "the source of its release," would
be highly irregular. 194
In fact, the Court broadly stated that the constitution prohibited
judicial restraint on the dissemination of truthful information already
in the public domain. 195 The very fact that the government issued the
information without qualification conveys the idea that the government
considered subsequent publication of the information lawful.- 9 Thus,
the Court concluded that imposing civil damages for merely reproduc97
ing the news release "would surely violate the First Amendment. 1
Additionally, the Court held that once the government released
information to the public domain, any hope of restitution rested in the
government. 198 The Court noted that the government's mishandling of
confidential information given by the victims created the source of the
release. - Accordingly, the government must be willing to compensate
those victims for their loss of privacy and the other consequences of
the disclosure.2°°
2.

Negligence per se

Since the application of the negligence per se theory to section
794.03 would result in impermissible "categorical prohibitions upon
media access . . .," the Court held the automatic imposition of liability
failed to serve the state's asserted interests. 20 1 The Court reasoned
that, unlike civil actions based on the common law tort of invasion of
privacy, claims based on section 794.03 would eliminate case-by-case

192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 2610.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 2612.
197. Id. Justice Marshall stated: 'The fact that appellant converted the police report into
a news story by adding linguistic connecting tissue necessary to transform the report's facts
into full sentences cannot change this result." Id.
198. Id. at 2611-12.
199. Id.
200. Id. Perhaps B.J.F. should not have settled with the Sheriffs Department. The Court
may have held the Sheriffs Department liable under the strict Daily Mail standard since the
Sheriffs Department released the information into the public domain.
201. Id. at 2612.
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findings that a reasonable person would find the disclosure highly
offensive. 202 Under the negligence per se theory, liability follows automatically from publication "regardless of whether the identity of the
victim is already known throughout the community; whether the victim
has voluntarily called public attention to the offense; or whether the
identity of the victim has otherwise become a subject of reasonable
public concern .
"...
,23 Further, the Court held the application of the
negligence per se theory to a nondisclosure statute would create a
''perverse result" because the first amendment would provide less
24
protection for truthful publications than for defamatory falsehoods. 0
The dissent responded by arguing the majority's negligence per se
concerns "miss the mark. '' 205 Justice White noted that the negligence
per se theory does not hold defendants liable without a showing of
negligence. 2°6 Instead, negligence per se means the legislature, not
the courts, sets the standard of care for determining negligence.207
Because the legislature reflects public opinion, Justice White upheld
the legislative determination that a reasonable person would find
categorically offensive the identification of a rape victim. 208 However,
if the statute automatically imposed liability, evidence that the victim's
identity was already known would enter into a jury's calculation of
29
damages.
3.

Underinclusiveness

The Court found that imposing liability on The FloridaStar failed
to serve the state's interests based on the "underinclusiveness" of
section 794.03.210 The nondisclosure statute only prohibits an "instrument of mass communication" from identifying a sexual offense victim. 211 Section 794.03 does not prohibit the spread of private information by other means, including the neighborhood or workplace gossip.212

202.

Id. See W.

KEETON,

D. DOBBS, R.

KEETON

& D.

OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON

ON THE LAW OF TORTS 356-59 (5th ed. 1984) (discussing the common law public disclosure of

private facts elements: (1) public disclosure, (2) private facts, and (3) matter would be highly
offensive and objectionable to a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities).
203. 109 S. Ct. at 2612.
205. Id. at 2617.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 2612.
211. Id.
212. Id.
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Thus, because the statute lacked "more careful and inclusive precautions against alternative forms of dissemination," the Court doubted
23
that section 794.03 actually served the significant interests advanced. '
The Court ruled: "When a state attempts the extraordinary measure
of punishing truthful publication in the name of privacy, [the state]
must demonstrate its commitment to advancing the interest by applying its prohibition even-handedly, to the small-time disseminator as
2
well as the media giant." 14
In a concurring opinion, Justice Antonin Scalia concluded that the
Court should overturn section 794.03 on the underinclusiveness ground
alone.215 Justice Scalia found that a law that "has every appearance

of a prohibition that society is prepared to impose upon the press but
not upon itself" could not "protect an interest 'of the highest order.' "216
Justice Scalia reasoned that the victim would experience just as
much discomfort from the dissemination of the news among friends
and acquaintances as the discomfort caused by the media publication.217
B.J.F.'s argument that the state intended to protect rape victims from
their assailants failed to persuade Justice Scalia. He reasoned that
"there would be little reason to limit a statute with that objective to
rape alone, '2 8 and that the trial court gave no jury instructions to
find that the rapist was still at large.219

The dissent argued that prior cases striking down laws due to
underinclusiveness involved situations where a legislature singled out
one segment of the news media for punishment, such as a newspaper
but not television news.2 ° Justice White wrote that section 794.03
"even-handely covers all 'instruments of mass communication'.., and
therefore [is] tailored almost as precisely as possible to achieving that
end. '"

Justice White argued that the Court should have analyzed all

of Florida's privacy tort law rather than just section 794.03, since the
lawsuit was an action for "the negligent publication" of B.J.F.'s name
rather than a prosecution for violating the statute.2 He reasoned that
in a negligence action, the Court should review the statute as a stand-

213. Id. at 2612-13.
214. Id. at 2613.
215. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
216. Id. at 2614. Such a law does not protect a state interest when the law leaves "appreciable damage" to the state interest unprohibited. Id. at 2613.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 2614.
220. Id. at 2617. (White, J., dissenting).
221. Id.
222. Id.
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ard of care.- However, Florida's common law tort for publication of
private facts would subject the neighborhood gossip to the same standard of care applied to the media.c. Self-censorship
Finally, the Court refused to contribute to the media's self-censorship by allowing punishment for publishing truthful information "released, without qualification,by the government. "5 Cox Broadcasting
established the principle against self-censorship in relation to official
court records, and the Florida Star Court extended this protection
to other information released by the government.2 By issuing a press
release without qualification, the government, specifically the sheriffs
department in FloridaStar, implied the press could lawfully disseminate the information.- 7 Thus, the application of the Daily Mail standard protects the press which relies on the government's implied representation. 2 Without such protection, the media would be forced
into the "onerous obligation" of sifting through public documents to
"prune out material arguably unlawful for publication." '
The dissent attacked this prong of the Court's analysis and claimed
that the government had not released the information "without qualification."-o Justice White reasoned that the sign posted in the sheriffs
press room, warning against publishing the names of rape victims,
qualified the release.3 1 Further, the reporter's admitted knowledge
of the law and the warning sign refuted the Court's holding that the
government implied that the press could lawfully disseminate the information.-2 According to the dissent's analysis, Florida law sufficiently protected rape victims by exempting their names from disclosure and forbidding officials from releasing such information. m Justice

223. Id.
224. Id. For this argument, White cited Cape Publications, Inc. v. Hitchner, 514 So. 2d
1136 (Fla. App. 1987), which the Florida Supreme Court overturned following Florida Star,
four months later.
225. 109 S. Ct. at 2610 (emphasis added).
226. Id.
227. Id. at 2610, 2612.
228. Id. at 2610.
229. Id. This reasoning appears to recognize FloridaStar's argument that "[t]he 310 exemptions to the disclosure provisions of the Public Records Act are scattered through the 960
chapters of the Florida Statutes." Id. Brief of Appellant at 18.
230. 109 S. Ct. at 2616.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id.
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White concluded that when a state takes such steps to prevent disclosure but mistakenly releases the protected information, the press
should "respect simple standards of decency" and not publish identifying information about a rape victim. 234

III.
A.

FLORIDA STAR APPLIED

Easton Publishingv. Boettger

Four months after deciding Florida Star, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in Easton Publishing v. Boettger,23 a
privacy case involving the media's disclosure of a state-intercepted
communication. The Court vacated the judgment of the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania, Eastern District, 236 and remanded the case for that
court to reconsider in light of Florida Star.? 7 Justice White's dissent
in Florida Star had predicted this result.2
In Boettger, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held a newspaper
liable in a civil action under a wiretapping and surveillance statute 9
for publishing excerpts of a transcript of an intercepted telephone
conversation obtained from court files2 ° In Boettger, state police tapped Alfred Boettger's telephone.-, Based on the intercepted information, the state charged Boettger with bookmaking, pool selling and
conspiracy.2 2 In response to a motion for discovery, the district attorney, in violation of the statute, inadvertently filed a copy of the transcript of the intercepted conversation with the clerk of courts.2 3 Following a hearing on Boettger's motion to suppress the intercepted information, a newspaper reporter requested and received the file from
the clerk's office.-" The newspaper published a story based on the
reporter's notes of the transcripts. 24 5 Boettger filed a lawsuit based

234. Id.
235. 110 S. Ct. 225 (1989).
236. 555 A.2d 1234 (Pa. 1989).
237. 110 S. Ct. at 225.
238. 109 S. Ct. at 2618, n.4 (White, J., dissenting) (citing Boettger, 555 A.2d at 1239-40).
Justice White found the ruling "that State cannot prevent publication of private facts about its
citizens which the State inadvertently discloses . . . particularly troubling when one considers
the extensive powers of the State to collect information." Id.
239. 18 PA. C.S. § 5725.
240. 555 A.2d at 1236.
241. Id.
242. Id.

243.

Id.

244.
245.

Id.
Id.
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on a civil action created by the statute, and the trial judge directed
a verdict in favor of Boettger on the issue of liability.? 6 On appeal,
the superior court agreed with the trial court that the reporter was
not authorized under the statute to disclose the intercepted communication. ? 7 However, the superior court created "an implied exemption
from liability" for media- s disclosures which are "of legitimate public
concern and lawfully obtained from court records accessible to the
public. "249
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed, finding no ground for
a media exemption.2 ° The court reasoned that the information was
not "readily obtainable through attendance in open court" and the
information was not "intentionally"placed in records accessible to the
public.251 The court also found that Boettger's right to privacy outweighed the right of the press to publish the transcripts, because the
first amendment privilege "directly related to government and the
public's interest in scrutiny of its function.' ' -2 Chief Justice Nix's dissenting opinion presaged the result reached by the United States
Supreme Court.- Chief Justice Nix placed the burden on the judicial
system to secure the documents. 2- Chief Justice Nix reasoned that
"To place the onus on the newspaper to keep secret that which is
public knowledge seriously conflicts with the First Amendment. ...
B.

Cape Publications, Inc. v. Hitchner

In 1987, when Florida Star came within the Florida Supreme
Court's jurisdiction, the court declined review. 256 However, four
months after the United States Supreme Court decided FloridaStar,
the Florida Supreme Court in Cape Publications, Inc. v. Hitchner,257

246. The jury returned a verdict of $1,000 in actual damages and $17,409.43 in attorney's
fees. Id.
247. Id. at 1237.
248. The superior court relied on Daily Mail, 443 U.S. at 97; Cox Broadcasting, 420 U.S.
at 469; Landmark Communications, 435 U.S. at 829; and Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District
Court, 430 U.S. 308 (1977). 555 A.2d at 1238.
249. Id. at 1235.
250. Id. at 1236.
251. Id. at 1239 (emphasis in original).
252. Id. at 1240.
253. Id. at 1240-41.
254. Id. at 1241.
255. Id. (citing Landmark Communications, 435 U.S. at 829).
256. 509 So. 2d 1117 (Fla. 1987). Accordingly, the United States Supreme Court obtained
jurisdiction to hear FloridaStar. 109 S. Ct. at 2607.
257. 549 So. 2d 1374 (Fla. 1989), reviewing 514 So. 2d 1136 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 1987).
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followed the United States Supreme Court's Florida Star decision.
Hitchner concerned the privacy interests of parents who stood trial
for aggravated child abuse. The issue was whether a newspaper can
be held liable for publishing lawfully obtained, confidential information
in a story about a child abuse trial.- 9 At the close of the state's
evidence in the child abuse trial, the trial judge directed a verdict in
favor of the parents, the Hitchners. 26° Section 827.07 of Florida's child
abuse law makes child abuse information confidential.2-' However, a
Cape Publications reporter covering the trial obtained the case file
from the prosecutor's office. 2 The file contained some allegations not
brought out at the trial.2 6 The newspaper published the confidential
information and reported that trial testimony brought out the allegations.24 The Hitchners sued for two counts of invasion of privacy and
two counts of libel.- The Hitchners based their invasion of privacy
claims on the newspaper's violation of section 827.07 which makes the
child abuse trial records and reports confidential.2- The trial court
granted partial summary judgment on liability against the newspaper. 267 The court determined that the statute was valid, that the
statute created a private cause of action, and that publication of infor2
mation protected by the statute was negligence as a matter of law. The Fifth District Court of Appeal affirmed and recognized the Hitch2
ners' claim as a proper common law action under a private-acts tort. 69
The elements of a private-acts tort include: (1) publication, (2) of
270
private facts, (3) that are offensive, and (4) not of public concern.
The Florida Supreme Court quashed the summary judgment and
narrowly held that the facts of Hitchner could not impose liability on
the newspaper.2 1 Citing Florida Star's definition of matters of public

258.
259.

549 So. 2d at 1375.
Id. The Hitchners were tried on a charge of maliciously punishing their daughter, a

violation of

FLA. STAT.

§ 827.03(3) (1979).

260.

549 So. 2d at 1375.

261.

FLA. STAT.

262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.

549 So. 2d at 1375.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1376.
Id.
Id. at 1377.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1375.

§ 827.07 (1981).
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concern, the court held that criminal matters reported in Hitchner
constituted matters of public concern, and therefore failed to meet
the fourth element of Florida's tort law.272 The court emphasized that
"the information published by Cape had been lawfully obtained, was
freely given by government officials and thus was legitimately within
the public domain. ' 273 Citing Cox Broadcasting, the court also held
that the information constituted a matter of legitimate public concern
because in writing the article, the newspaper intended to "scrutinize
the judicial process" and "what it considered to be a questionable
judicial determination." ' 4
C.

United States v. Wallington

In United States v. Wallington,275 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit cited FloridaStar in affirming the conviction
of a public employee for divulging confidential information obtained
within the scope of his official duties.276 Wallace G. Wallington was an
employee of the United States Customs Service.277 The Customs Service assigned Wallington to the Regional Intelligence Branch, which
maintained a computer database of federal and state law enforcement
files. 278 Wallington ran a computer check on several people and gave
the information to a friend who was not authorized to receive it.- 9
Consequently, the government charged Wallington with disclosing information in violation of a federal law- prohibiting unauthorized disclosure by federal officers and employees of any employment-related
confidential information.s In a jury trial, the district court convicted
Wallington who appealed, arguing the statute constituted an overbroad
restriction of free expression.?2
The court of appeals upheld the statute.- The court of appeals
reasoned that in conducting public affairs, the government's ability to
preserve the confidentiality of its records is essential to the govern-

272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.

Id. at 1379.
Id.
Id. at 1378.
889 F.2d 573 (5th Cir. 1989).
Id. at 574.
Id.
Id.
Id.
18 U.S.C. § 1905.
889 F.2d at 575.
Id.
Id. at 579.
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ment's ability to collect information from citizens.- The court of appeals noted the United States Supreme Court's suggestion in Florida
Star "that the government has particularly extensive power to control
the disclosure of sensitive information within its custody, and that the
government may sanction its employees where 'the mishandling of
sensitive information leads to its dissemination.' "2 The court found
that the prohibition imposed on government employees from knowingly
disclosing confidential information struck a permissible balance between the first amendment and "the practical necessities of public
service. "D.

Ross v. Midwest Communications

Recently a petition to the United State Supreme Court to review
Ross v. Midwest Communications cited FloridaStar.- 7 However, the
Court denied certiorari. 21 The Ross review petition sought review of
an invasion-of-privacy action filed by a rape victim against a television
station. 2 9 The station broadcast identifying information about the victim in a documentary questioning the guilt of a man convicted of a
similar rape.2 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment for the
television station.-, The Fifth Circuit ruled that the details of the
Ross rape were relevant to the issue the broadcast presented and
that the issue constituted a legitimate matter of public concern. 292
Citing Landmark Communications, the court recognized the state's
"power to protect rape victim's privacy by preserving the confidentiality of the state's records and punishing any who steal the information. ' ' 293 The court further stated "Liability for the wrongful taking of
information could encompass damages resulting from the foreseeable
publication of the information. '"-

284.

Id.

285. Id. (citing Florida Star, 109 S. Ct. at 2609).
286. Id.
287. 870 F.2d 271 (5th Cir.) (affirming summary judgment for journalists in a state law
invasion-of-privacy claim brought by a rape victim), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 326 (1989).
288. 110 S. Ct. at 326.
289. See the Ross petition review in Rape Victim Asserts Privacy Interest in Name, 16(33)
MEDIA L. REP. (Sept. 26, 1989).
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291.
292.
293.
294.

870 F.2d at 271.
Id.
Id. at 275.
Id.
Id.
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Three months after Ross, the United States Supreme Court decided
Florida Star. The Ross petition argued that the Supreme Court's
decision in FloridaStar sent a "devastating" message to rape victims,
shattering "the fragile confidence [that] rape survivors possessed in
law enforcement promises that their identities would not be disclosed." 95 The petition asked the Court to "make clear to survivors
of rape that the law provides them some means of redress when their
identities are wrongfully disclosed. '"IV.

THE PRIVACY IMPLICATIONS OF FLORIDA STAR

Florida Star leaves unanswered the questions of which types of
privacy actions will succeed and what kinds of nondisclosure laws will
the courts tolerate? The Florida Star dissent redefined the issue in
Florida Star with a dire prediction that the private facts tort would
be obliterated.2 7 Justice White narrowed the issue to "whether there
is any information about people, which - though true - may not be
published by the press."28 Justice White further noted that the Florida
Star Court's reliance on the Daily Mail standard
obliterate[s] one of the most note-worthy legal inventions of
the 20th-Century: the tort of the publication of private facts
. . . . Even if the Court's opinion does not say as much
today, such obliteration will follow inevitably from the
I doubt that there remain any
Court's conclusion here ....
"private facts" which persons may assume will not be published in the newspapers, or broadcast on television.2
Despite the dissent's criticism, the Daily Mail standard mirrors the
language found in earlier Supreme Court opinions concerning prior
restraint and the regulation of expression.
A.

Restraint on and Regulation of Expression

Historically, the Court holds that the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment requires the courts' scrutiny of the government's attempts to restrain or regulate expression."o The judiciary's

295.
296.

297.
298.
299.
300.
(1976).

16(33) MEDIA L. REP., supra note 289.
Id.

109 S.Ct. at 2618.
Id.
Id.
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64-65

WHEN IDENTITIES ARE WRONGFULLY DISCLOSED

usual deference to the legislature "cannot limit judicial inquiry when
First Amendment rights are at stake. ' °1 Moreover, the government
"carries a heavy burden of showing justification" for a restraint on
expression.- ° The government must demonstrate "a sufficiently important interest" to justify the restraint. 303 Additionally, the government
must demonstrate how effective the restraint would be in achieving
the government's stated interest3 ° Specifically, the restraint which
should be "narrowly drawn °5 must be the "least drastic means" available to accomplish the government's stated interest. 3°6
In earlier prior restraint cases, former United State Supreme Court
Justice Potter Stewart suggested several ways the government may
achieve its stated interests. 3 7 Justice Stewart reasoned: If the government's stated interest requires the nondisclosure of information in its
custody, even if the interest advanced involves national security, the
responsibility to protect the confidentiality of the information "must
''3°
be where the power is.
Thus, the government may deny access to
information and punish anyone who steals information in the government's custody.3 The Florida Star Court endorsed Justice Potter's
suggestion.
However, the FloridaStar Court never addressed the newspaper's
argument that the nondisclosure statute operated as a prior restraint.
Likewise, the Daily Mail Court, which developed the standard applied
in FloridaStar, declined to decide whether the statute in question in
that case operated as a prior restraint. 310 The Daily Mail Court, relying
on Landmark Communications, ruled the government must demonstrate that any punitive action against the press further the state
interest asserted, including punishment after publication311 Thus, the
Daily Mail standard extends a balancing test to privacy actions for
determining proper government restraints on government released
information.
301. Landmark Communications, 435 U.S. at 843.
302. Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971). See also Nebraska
Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 558 (1976).
303. 424 U.S. at 25. See also Schad v. Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 68 (1981).
304. 427 U.S. at 562.
305. 452 U.S. at 68.
306. First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786 (1978). See also Nebraska Press Ass'n
v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) for a discussion of the court's duty to examine alternative means
to balance first amendment rights of the press with sixth amendment rights of defendants.
307. New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 728 (1971) (Stewart, J., concurring).
308. Id.
309. Landmark Communications, 435 U.S. at 848 (Stewart, J., concurring).
310. 443 U.S. at 102.
311. Id. (citing 435 U.S. at 843).
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B. "A Proper Case"
In the FloridaStar dissent, Justice White's criticism of the majority extension of the Daily Mail standard misstated the majority's
holding. Justice White interpreted the majority's findings as "protecting a rape victim's right to privacy is not among those state interests
of the highest order.' 3 12 However, the majority stated that undeniably
the state's asserted interests, including protecting the victim's privacy,
are "highly significant. ' '313 Justice Marshall's majority opinion never
implied a hierarchy of state interests that placed "highly significant"
below "highest order." Further, unlike the Court's ruling in Landmark
Communications, the Florida Star majority never ruled that the interests asserted insufficiently justified the restraints on the press.
Indeed, the Florida Star majority held that in "a proper case" the
state may impose civil sanctions for publishing the name of a rape
victim. 314 The majority defined a "proper case" as one in which advancement of the state interests would overwhelmingly necessitate imposing
sanctions. 315 But the majority failed to provide any examples of what
might constitute such a proper case.
Because the Court found the categorical prohibition of negligence
per se unconstitutional when applied to the press, future civil cases
must base any sanctions on common law torts or limited statutes that
permit case-by-case analyses. 316 The Florida Star Court held that establishing tort elements, such as whether the published matter concerned a matter of public significance or whether a reasonable person
would find the disclosure highly offensive, requires case-by-case
analyses. 317 However, the Court also noted that historically, and "without exception," the Court upheld the press's right to publish in conflicts
with privacy. 3'8 Without negligence per se, courts must rely on other
negligence standards. For example, the Fifth Circuit in Ross suggested
that liability for the wrongful taking of information could encompass
damages resulting from the foreseeable publication of the information.3 19
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C.

"A Proper Statute"

1. Truthful Information, Lawfully Obtained
Echoing the language of the Court in the seminal prior restraint
case, Near v. Minnesota,32 the Florida Star Court declined to rule
whether the government may ever subject truthful publications to
civil or criminal liability.32 1 However, the Court in Daily Mail asserted
that "state action to punish the publication of truthful information
seldom can satisfy constitutional standards." 3= Overall, the Court
clearly extends first amendment protection to lawfully obtained information that the government releases into the public domain.- The
Florida Star Court ruled that absent a statute making the receipt of
information unlawful, placing information in the public domain renders
receipt lawful.-s
2.

Unlawfully Obtained Information

In FloridaStar, the Court never settled the question of whether
the press may be punished for the unlawful acquisition of private
information. 3 2 However, the Court previously extended first amendment protection to the publication of confidential information where
the lawfulness of the source was unclear, 32 and to the publication of
classified documents that the newspaper illegitimately possessed.Further, the Court will probably not tolerate a statute that makes
the receipt of confidential information unlawful unless the statute includes a provision allowing the courts to determine on a case-by-case
3
basis whether the statute's application passes constitutional scrutiny. ?
Finally, because of the unique duty of the press to scrutinize the
operations of government, and the necessity of government records

320. 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (hypothesizing instances when it might tolerate prior restraint,
such as the "publication of the sailing dates of transports or the number and location of troops").
321. 109 S. Ct. at 2608-2609.
322. 443 U.S. at 102.
323. 109 S. Ct. at 2609-2610.
324. Id. at 2611.
325. Id. at 2610 n.8.
326. Landmark Communications,435 U.S. at 829 (where the disclosure concerned confidential investigations into judicial misconduct).
327. New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (where the press received
copies of stolen classified documents known as the Pentagon Papers).
328. The FloridaStar Court's language suggests that it may not find such a statute constitutional: "Even assuming the Constitution permitted a State to proscribe receipt of information,
Florida has not taken this step." Id. at 2611 (emphasis in original).
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to provide the basic data of government operations, courts may need
to determine whether any information constitutes a matter of public
significance.
The Ross petition asked the Court to consider whether the constitution protected the disclosure of private facts obtained from a private
source, or an unnamed confidential source.3 29 Although the Court denied review of Ross, the FloridaStar Court asserted as an alternative
that the government may under some circumstances statutorily forbid
nonconsensual acquisition of sensitive information resting in private
hands.- ° The Court reasoned that such a statute would fall outside of
the requirements imposed by the Daily Mail standardY8 '
3.

Alternatives

Encouraging the government to use the "least drastic means" to
accomplish the government's stated interest is an important feature
of the Daily Mail standard. Accordingly, the Florida Star Court
suggested several alternative means of protecting information in the
state's custody. First, the government can deny access to certain
information and punish the unlawful acquisition of information.32 The
Court also suggested that a damages remedy should apply to the
government when the government mishandles information.- Thus,
restitution may depend on the government's "willingness" to compensate victims and to protect victims from the consequences of the wrongful disclosure.The appellant's brief in Florida Star listed only three states with
statutes that impose criminal penalties for publication of the names
6
of sexual offense victims: Florida, Georgia- and South Carolina.Nine states place the burden of protecting government-held private
information on the government. The appellant's brief stated:
For the most part, these [nine] statutes regulate the conduct
of administrative officials and court employees ....

329.

16(33)

MEDIA

L.

REP.,

supra note 289.

330. 109 S. Ct. at 2609.
331. Id.
332. Landmark Communications, 435 U.S. at 849 (Stewart, J., concurring).
333. 109 S. Ct. at 2609.
334. Id. at 2611-12.
335. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-23 (1988), revised to reflect the Court's finding in Cox Broadcasting, 420 U.S. at 469.
336. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-730 (1976).
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Although several of these statutes provide criminal penalties for violations by any person, they nonetheless focus on
protecting information in the possession of the government
... . Clearly, this procedure places the burden of confidentiality on law enforcement officials, and accomplishes the
purpose of keeping the victim's identity withdrawn from pub7
lic view without unconstitutional restraint on the pressY3
Consequently, the Florida Star decision squarely places the onus
of protecting information in government custody on government officials and employees. In Wallington, the fifth circuit cited the Florida
Star Court's endorsement of internal safeguards to uphold a federal
Howemployee's conviction for divulging confidential information.
ever, state-imposed penalties on government employees and officials
for divulging information may create a chilling effect on the release
of public information. Therefore, although the press escaped punishment for publishing private information lawfully obtained, in the future, the press may encounter more difficulty in acquiring public documents to which the public is legally entitled.
Ironically, just three months before FloridaStar, the Court placed
a new restriction on the press's access to public records. In United
States Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of
the Press,39 the Court upheld a rejection of a request under the Freedom of Information Act- 0 for the Federal Bureau of Investigation's
(FBI) computerized compilation of public records.1 The Court denied
access despite the records' special public interest potential and despite
the fact that before the FBI compiled information in one databank,
individual public records contained the information. 42 In his Florida
Star dissent, Justice White pointed out the irony of the Court's reasoning in Reporters Committee. 3 The Reporters Committee Court
reasoned that when the government controlled information about a
private citizen "as a compilation, rather than as a record of 'what the

337. Brief of Appellant, at 10-11.
338. 109 S. Ct. at 2609. The Florida Star Court had suggested classifying information and
enforcing procedures to ensure redacted release. Cited in United States v. Wallington, 889 F.2d
573, 579 (5th Cir. 1989).
339. 109 S. Ct. 1468 (1989).
340. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552 (1982 ed., Supp. IV).
341. 109 S. Ct. at 1485.
342. Id. at 1473.
343. 109 S. Ct. at 2619 (White, J., dissenting, citing United States Department of Justice
v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of Press, 109 S. Ct. at 1468, 1485 (1989)).
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government was up to', the privacy interest . . . is . . . at its apex
while the ... public interest in disclosure is at its nadir."- The Court
ruled that disclosure of rap sheets, gathered from public records at
courthouses across the nation, constitute categorically unwarranted
invasions of privacy." 5
4.

Inclusiveness

Finally, for a statute to adequately serve the government's asserted
interest, the statute must apply prohibitions evenly "to the small-time
disseminator as well as the media giant. ' '3 6 The Florida Star Court
specifically called for "more careful and inclusive precautions against
alternative forms of dissemination," including dissemination by individuals.3 7 As Justice Scalia suggested, society must be prepared to impose
upon itself any prohibition that it is prepared to impose upon the
press. Justice Scalia also suggested that if the state intends to protect
rape victims from their assailants, a statute should protect victims of
other crimes as well, and juries should have to determine whether a
perpetrator remains at large.3 9
V.

CONCLUSION

The decision in FloridaStar naturally evolved from Cox Broadcasting, which extended constitutional protection to the publication of
information released in open court. The Florida Star Court further
extended constitutional protection to the publication of other information released by the government. Using the Daily Mail standard, the
Court gave limited protection to any lawfully obtained, truthful information about a matter of public significance. The Court reasoned that
the state may punish publication only if the state can show that the
punishment is narrowly tailored to further a state interest of the
highest order. The Court also ruled that the establishment of the
elements of privacy tort laws, including whether the published matter
concerns a matter of public significance, requires case-by-case
analyses. Finally, courts may look beyond the specific disclosure to
the entire article to determine the matter's public significance.
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Yet, Florida Star narrowly held: That the state failed to achieve
admittedly significant interests by imposing liability on the press based
on section 794.03. Additionally, as long as section 794.03 singles out
the press, the statute fails to meet the Daily Mail standard. However,
the Court warns the press that the Daily Mail standard is not an
impossible test for the government. Civil sanctions, overwhelmingly
necessary to advance the state's interests, establish a proper case for
state-imposed sanctions on publishing the name of a rape victim.
Significantly, the Florida Star decision requires the government
to take responsibility to protect information in its custody. Unfortunately, penalties imposed on government employees and officials for
divulging information may have a chilling effect on the release of public
information. Even in Florida, where official custodians of public records can face misdemeanor charges and civil penalties for intentionally
withholding public records, increasing exposure to civil liability for
inadvertently releasing exempted information may cause the public
official to err on the side of denying or at least delaying access to
public records. Further, delays to access often operate as denials to
reporters on a deadline or to a press concerned with timely reports.
Finally, the Court in FloridaStar, as in Cox Broadcasting, leaves
open the question "'whether truthful publications may ever be subjected to civil or criminal liability' for invading 'an area of privacy'
defined by the State. '"- However, requiring a state to narrowly tailor
its remedies to serve an interest of the highest order should maintain
the constitutional protection afforded to publishing the truth. 351

350. Id. at 2609 (quoting Cox Broadcasting,420 U.S. at 491).
351. Radhert, Star Ruling a 1st Amendment Smorgasbord, 13 The Brechner Report 6
(July 1989).

